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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Programme budget for the biennium 2000-2001

Human resources management

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

Report of the Secretary-General*

I. Introduction

1. The report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 54/192 of 17 December 1999 and 54/249 of 23 December 1999 in which the Assembly recognized the need to review the existing safety and security arrangements for United Nations personnel and requested the Secretary-General to propose measures for their improvement. It contains an outline of the threats against United Nations personnel, a comprehensive description of the existing security management structure and proposals to enhance the safety and security of United Nations personnel. It was prepared in consultation with the members of the Administrative Committee on Coordination. This report covers the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. However, as has been the practice in the past, information on deaths of staff members at the time of finalization of the report is also included.

* The present report is being submitted after lengthy consultations with members of the Administrative Committee on Coordination.

II. Overview

2. The current security management system was designed to meet the operational requirements of the United Nations system which existed 20 years ago. Over the past few years, in response to the mandates entrusted to them by Member States, staff members are increasingly being sent to provide assistance in situations of open warfare and hostility. As a result, from 1 January 1992 to 18 September 2000, 198 civilian staff have lost their lives in the service of the United Nations. During the reporting period, 21 staff members belonging to organizations of the United Nations system paid the ultimate price by sacrificing their lives; in the period from 1 July to 18 September 2000, four more staff members lost their lives (for details of each case see annex II). Some 240 staff members have been taken hostage or kidnapped in 63 separate incidents since 1 January 1994. Staff members of the United Nations have also experienced an unprecedented number of cases of rape and sexual assault, armed robbery, attacks on humanitarian

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convoys, car-jackings, harassment and arrest and detention.

3. In order to provide assistance and protection to the world's neediest people, United Nations personnel have had to work in difficult and dangerous situations and have increasingly become victims of the environments in which they operate. The purpose of the United Nations security system is to "protect the protectors", and all organizations as a whole have a "duty of care" towards their personnel. Regrettably, the system is currently not able to adequately fulfil its responsibilities despite the best efforts and dedication of all those involved in the present security management system.

4. Over the past year, both the General Assembly and the Security Council have focused particular attention on the issue of the security of United Nations and associated personnel. In resolution 54/192, the General Assembly noted the increasingly difficult context in which humanitarian assistance takes place and the continuous erosion of respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. It deplored the rise in casualties among national and international humanitarian personnel, as well as the acts of murder and other forms of violence, including abduction, hostage-taking, kidnapping, harassment and illegal arrest and detention, to which United Nations personnel in humanitarian operations and elsewhere are increasingly exposed. The General Assembly reiterated that the primary responsibility under international law for the protection of United Nations personnel lies with host Governments, and urged all parties involved in armed conflict to ensure the security of humanitarian personnel. The Assembly further urged all States to take the necessary measures to ensure the full and effective implementation of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as the relevant provisions related to the safety and security of humanitarian personnel.

5. The Security Council held an open debate on the protection of United Nations and associated personnel on 9 February 2000. In her opening statement at the meeting, the Deputy Secretary-General outlined the efforts being made by the United Nations to improve the security management system while at the same time calling on Member States to provide the necessary support. In a statement made by the President at the end of the meeting (S/PRST/2000/4), the Security Council expressed its grave concern at the continued attacks against United Nations and associated personnel and humanitarian personnel. The Security Council urged States and non-State parties to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel and to ensure their safety and security, and underlined the importance of unhindered access to populations in need.

6. I have been greatly encouraged by these clear expressions of concern by the General Assembly and the Security Council and the unanimous recognition by Member States that measures are urgently required to reverse this unacceptable trend of deteriorating conditions under which United Nations staff are required to work.

7. Yet the dangers on the ground remain real and constant. In part, this is due to the inability of Governments to maintain order in certain areas and in part due to deliberate and targeted aggression by paramilitary or other irregular groups. On 6 September 2000, while world leaders were assembled in New York at the Millennium Summit, three staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were savagely murdered in West Timor (Indonesia). The Heads of State and Government present at the summit condemned that attack and stood in silent tribute when they heard the tragic news. This concern must be translated into concrete action.

8. It is universally recognized that the security of staff cannot be ensured if they do not receive specialized training, if they do not have communications equipment, and if they do not have access to expert advice and leadership from professional security officers in dangerous situations. Currently, at the Headquarters level, there are only eight Professional staff responsible for coordinating and managing the security system covering 70,000 staff and dependants at over 150 duty stations. There are only 60 cost-shared security officers in the field while there are some 80 high-risk duty stations where the presence of at least one field security officer would be warranted. This is clearly an untenable situation and urgent remedial actions are called for.

III. Current security management system and its limitations

A. Threats against United Nations personnel

9. Many of the situations where humanitarian personnel face security risks are also those where the international community has been unable to act to prevent or stop conflicts that give rise to the displacement of populations. In these circumstances, Governments often look to the international humanitarian response to substitute for the very action that would at least help to ensure the safety of the affected civilian populations and humanitarian staff. While all necessary measures may have been taken by the United Nations system to enhance the safety and security of its staff, no security arrangements can be effective without the full commitment of host Governments.

10. Another problem which can increase the risks to United Nations personnel is insufficient awareness in countries hosting United Nations operations of responsibilities with regard to the security of staff. In some countries, threats to United Nations system personnel can in part be fuelled by negative statements or campaigns by senior officials or others through the media. Some of these statements have included incitement to violence against personnel of the United Nations system. In other instances, staff members belonging to specific ethnic, linguistic or cultural affiliations have encountered threats from some members of the population. Attacks on United Nations personnel can also be used as a means of gaining political visibility and recognition at the expense of individual United Nations staff members.

11. Threats to United Nations system staff take many forms. During the reporting period, 59 United Nations system personnel were abducted and held hostage in 12 separate incidents. Of these incidents (all of which were resolved successfully in accordance with United Nations policy regarding this issue), three occurred in Sierra Leone, two in Somalia, two in the Sudan, three in Georgia and one each in Guatemala and Thailand.

12. In addition to hostage-taking, United Nations system offices and premises are frequently occupied by individuals seeking to draw attention to their cause. UNHCR reported four such incidents in the first quarter of 1999, including the occupation of UNHCR headquarters. There have been incidents of asylum-seekers turning violent; one such incident resulted in the maiming of an office guard. In Afghanistan, UNHCR offices were stormed by mobs eight times during a one-week period as a result of a protest against the United Nations. Property belonging to the United Nations, especially vehicles, are regularly seized. UNICEF reported seizure of its vehicles by the authorities and armed groups in Afghanistan and the Sudan.

13. Criminality represents a growing threat to United Nations system staff at many locations worldwide, including some headquarters locations which are considered to be high-risk duty stations as a consequence of the high crime rate. In those locations, armed vehicle hijackings, violent robberies, muggings and other street crimes continue to be a problem.

14. Another threat to the security of United Nations system personnel is the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance in many locations throughout the world where United Nations staff operate.

15. Very few of the cases in which United Nations system staff members have been killed or attacked have been brought to justice: to date only 3 of the 177 cases involving the violent death of United Nations system personnel have been brought to justice. This lack of action may create the impression that United Nations system staff can be attacked with impunity. In an effort to highlight these cases, beginning with the present report, all documents which provide information regarding the deaths of staff members will also provide information on actions the host Government involved is taking to apprehend and convict the perpetrators.

16. In addition to the attacks and threats against United Nations personnel, non-governmental organization partners of United Nations humanitarian organizations that operate in the same environment are subjected to the same treatment in complex emergencies. It is recognized that threats against non-governmental organization staff can also directly affect the United Nations humanitarian assistance programmes, especially since conflicting parties often do not distinguish between United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel. In an effort to improve security cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee

has asked the World Food Programme (WFP) to chair a consultative process to address this issue.

B. Arrests, detentions and other restrictions

17. In accordance with prior practice, the present report provides information regarding cases of arrest and detention and cases of staff members who are missing or whose whereabouts remain unknown, some for almost 20 years. A consolidated list of staff members under arrest and detention or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations have been unable to exercise fully their right to protection is set out in annex III.

18. According to information provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the total number of its staff arrested and detained decreased from 55 during the previous reporting period to 40 in the current reporting period. Most staff members were released without charge or trial after relatively short periods of detention. The number of staff members who remained in detention at the close of the reporting period was 11, two of whom have been detained without charge since 1996.

19. The Agency reports that it was not always provided with adequate and timely information by the relevant authorities as to the reasons for the arrest and detention of its staff members and was therefore unable to fully exercise its right to functional protection of staff members arrested and detained.

20. With regard to detainees in Rwanda, the designated official for security has continued to raise their cases with the highest officials in the Ministry of Justice. The number of those detained has been reduced and the remaining detainees have been visited on a regular basis by the deputy field security officer, who reports that they are in good condition. Some of them are working in prison administration while awaiting trial.

21. On 15 May 2000, six UNHCR and non-governmental organization staff members on mission in the eastern part of the Republic of the Congo were arrested by forces of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo inside the territory of the Republic of the Congo. These individuals were severely mistreated during their detention and subjected to verbal abuse and beatings before they were expelled to the Republic of the Congo after having been moved from Mbandaka to Kinshasa. On 16 June, the United Nations Security Coordinator transmitted a note verbale to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requesting an immediate investigation to identify and punish those responsible for this incident. To date there has been no reply. This incident is the most serious in a series involving United Nations personnel. UNICEF reports at least six incidents where staff members were arrested for a variety of reasons, including being in possession of a satellite telephone and walking in proximity to a government office.

22. Immediately prior to the reporting period, in April 1999, unidentified armed men abducted 17 aid workers on an assessment mission in northern Liberia for several days. Some United Nations system staff were physically attacked and their vehicles and property stolen. Another incident occurred in the same region in August 1999 where nine non-governmental organization staff were abducted and released within 28 hours. During the latter incursion by dissident forces, 800 tons of WFP food were also looted.

23. In Sierra Leone, beginning on 1 May 2000, more than 500 personnel of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were held at various locations within RUF-controlled territory. During their detention, the peacekeepers were stripped of their uniforms, weapons and personal effects. In some cases they were mistreated and suffered from lack of adequate food, shelter and medical treatment. This most egregious example of illegal detention ended with the release of the last group of detainees on 29 June 2000. It should be noted that there were also some 20 reported cases of arrest and detention of non-governmental organization humanitarian staff, who were held for various lengths of time by warring parties during this reporting period.

24. A number of countries routinely deny visas to United Nations system staff members of particular nationalities while other Member States impose restrictions on the travel of staff members and their dependants. With regard to the continued imposition of restrictions on the travel of staff members and their dependants who are nationals of particular countries, I would like to reiterate my well-known position of principle that such restrictions applied to United

Nations system staff solely on the basis of nationality are discriminatory.

C. United Nations security management system

1. General

25. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and their dependants rests with host Governments. This responsibility flows from every Government's normal and inherent function of maintaining law and order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. Under Article 105, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the United Nations is entitled to enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. Such privileges and immunities have been further elaborated in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly at its first session, on 13 February 1946 (resolution 22 A (I)). The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, adopted by the Assembly in its resolution 179 (II) of 21 November 1947, covers similar matters with regard to the specialized agencies.

26. In order to highlight the shortcomings of the present security management system, it is necessary to describe the existing security arrangement in some detail. As the Chief Executive Officer of the Organization, I am responsible for ensuring that all steps have been taken to protect staff members and their dependants, particularly during times of crisis. In order to meet this obligation, a set of rules and procedures was instituted in 1980 on an inter-agency basis (as codified in the Field Security Handbook) and revised in 1991 and 1994 to meet changing needs. Security policies and practices are reviewed on an annual basis by an Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security. The reports of this meeting are reviewed and approved by the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which has included security of staff as a standing issue on its agenda. Between meetings, an informal working group is convened by the United Nations Security Coordinator whenever there is a need to discuss specific security issues. The most recent Ad Hoc Meeting on Security was held at Bonn from 16 to 18 May 2000.

2. Arrangements at Headquarters

(a) Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

27. In order to assist me in the fulfilment of my obligations for the security of United Nations system personnel, I have appointed a United Nations Security Coordinator who, currently, is a senior official at the Under-Secretary-General level who also shoulders other responsibilities.

28. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator is responsible, inter alia, for all policy and procedural matters related to security. It is expected to ensure a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation and formulate detailed recommendations to safeguard the security of staff and eligible dependants of the United Nations system. The Office coordinates, plans and implements inter-agency security and safety programmes, including all training, and acts as the focal point for inter-agency cooperation concerning security matters. The Office consults, as appropriate and time permitting, all organizations whose operations in any country would be affected by a security decision. In addition, it assesses on a continuing basis the extent to which staff of the United Nations system and operations worldwide are exposed or vulnerable to security problems. It reviews security plans formulated by United Nations staff in each country and ensures that each duty station has an adequate state of preparedness regarding contingency planning.

29. On my behalf, the Office of the Security Coordinator takes all decisions relating to the relocation or evacuation of staff members and their eligible dependants from very insecure areas. On behalf of the United Nations system, the Office manages the malicious acts insurance policy which at present covers 30,000 staff in 78 duty stations. It manages and coordinates incidents involving hostage-taking, arrest and detention of United Nations system staff. The Office develops and conducts security and stress management training for staff members of the United Nations system. It also investigates, as appropriate, cases involving the death of a staff member under malicious or suspicious circumstances.

30. The Office, which was created in 1988, consists of nine Professional and four General Service staff members, who are responsible for undertaking all the responsibilities outlined above as well as ensuring the

coordination of security at 150 duty stations, covering 70,000 civilian staff members and their dependants. The current level of staffing is clearly inadequate to meet the minimum requirements for the large number of staff assigned in all parts of the world.

31. At present, funding for the Office comes from a multitude of sources. Of the Professional posts, two are funded on a cost-shared basis by the organizations of the United Nations system, three are funded from the support account for peacekeeping operations, one by WFP, one jointly by UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR, one by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and one by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Of the General Service staff, two are cost-shared on an inter-agency basis; one is funded by UNDP and one by WFP.

32. The operating budget of the Office of the Security Coordinator is funded on a cost-shared basis by the organizations of the United Nations system. For 1999, the United Nations regular budget bore approximately 18 per cent of the total costs of $650,880; the proportions borne by other organizations were as follows: United Nations Volunteers, 17.5 per cent, UNICEF, 10 per cent, UNHCR, 9 per cent, the World Health Organization, 8 per cent, UNDP, 7 per cent, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 5 per cent. All other organizations each were billed less than 5 per cent of the total cost. The Office's budget is included in the programme budget of the United Nations for the biennium 2000-2001 under section 30E, Inter-organizational security measures. For the biennium 2000-2001, excluding funds required for payment of the premium for the malicious acts insurance policy, the Office's budget amounts to approximately $1 million for all security expenses, including the costs of the four inter-agency posts. In addition to the provision made under section 30, Special expenses, the General Assembly authorizes the Secretary-General on a biannual basis to enter into financial commitments in the amount of up to $500,000 to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses that may be required for inter-organizational security measures, pursuant to section IV of its resolution 36/235 of 18 December 1981. The provision covers such unforeseen expenses as costs of evacuation, movable equipment for security purposes, and emergency short-term security personnel in the field deemed necessary by the United Nations Security Coordinator.

33. In 1998, a trust fund for the security of staff members of the United Nations system was established to supplement existing inter-agency funding mechanisms. The purpose of the fund is to receive voluntary contributions to support the following activities undertaken by the Office: security and stress management training; stress counselling; provision of short-term security personnel; development of software to enhance security management; and security missions. As at 1 August 2000, contributions to the trust fund had been received from the Governments of Finland ($102,000), Japan ($1 million), Monaco ($8,500) and Norway ($100,000). Pledges or indications of intent had also been received from Argentina, Canada, the Netherlands and Senegal. This disappointing response has limited the ability of the United Nations Security Coordinator to provide security training and to undertake other activities which would enhance the safety and security of the United Nations personnel. An additional $5 million would be required to ensure that staff at all duty stations are adequately trained and new staff would need to be trained as they are recruited.

(b) Arrangements at the headquarters of United Nations organizations, programmes and funds

34. The Executive Head of each organization of the United Nations system has appointed an official who acts as the security focal point for the management of security within his/her respective organization and liaises with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. These focal points support their field offices through regular contacts and participate in joint inter-agency security assessment missions. They also ensure that the staff of their organizations comply with system-wide security instructions.

35. A number of programme headquarters (UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) have established their own security sections which are guided by the policy set by the United Nations Security Coordinator. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has established the position of Security Coordinator at Geneva from extrabudgetary resources. It is planned to incorporate this position within an emergency response capability.

36. UNICEF has one P-5 and one General Service staff member funded from the regular budget at its headquarters, as well as one L-3 funded from extrabudgetary sources. UNICEF has also established a

24-hour operations centre staffed by one L-4 and two General Service staff from regular budget and seven Professionals funded from extrabudgetary sources.

37. UNHCR has four Professional staff members at its headquarters (1 P-5, 3 P-4) and two General Service. These posts are funded by the annual programme budget for programme support costs. It does not have a 24-hour operations centre. An operations centre is staffed by personnel from the UNHCR geographic bureaux whenever it is determined that there is an emergency.

38. The World Food Programme established a field security task force in 1998 to review security and safety measures and to advise the Executive Director. In addition, WFP has established a security cell at its headquarters which will soon consist of four staff members. In 1999 and 2000 this cell has been able to deploy a security officer to crisis areas on short notice. WFP has also provided 24-hour coverage to its field operations through its security desk which receives and passes messages to and from the field, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and UNICEF operations centres during non-working hours.

3. Arrangements in the field

(a) Security plan

39. The primary management tool for security preparedness at any duty station is the country-specific security plan. Written in conformity with established procedures and subject to the approval of the United Nations Security Coordinator, it defines the various relevant responsibilities at the duty station, the actions to be taken and the sequence to be followed in response to a security crisis. The plan is updated as necessary (but at least annually) to reflect changing security conditions and it may contain several options for various contingencies.

40. Under the current arrangements, the response by the organizations of the United Nations system to threats to the safety of personnel has been divided into five phases, as follows:

(a) In *phase one*, which is precautionary, travel to the area requires prior clearance by the designated official;

(b) In *phase two*, all personnel and their dependants are restricted to their homes unless otherwise instructed. All movement is severely restricted and has to be specifically authorized by the designated official;

(c) In *phase three*, the following measures may be taken: concentration of personnel and their dependants at sites that are deemed safe; relocation to other parts of the country; relocation of dependants and non-essential personnel outside the country;

(d) In *phase four*, programmes are suspended and personnel not directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian relief operations or security matters are relocated;

(e) In *phase five*, all personnel are evacuated except those required for Security Council-mandated activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security.

41. Phases one and two may be declared by the designated official. The subsequent phases and measures will normally only be implemented after authorization has been obtained from the Secretary-General. Security phases may be implemented in sequential order or as the situation dictates. Situations may occur where one part of the country is under a different phase from the remainder of the country.

42. Security arrangements are intended to cover all personnel, except that locally recruited personnel and their dependants are not normally evacuated unless their security is endangered as a direct consequence of their employment by a United Nations organization. Each security plan must make provisions for the internal relocation of locally recruited staff and their dependants to a safe area and for the payment of three months' salary advance.

(b) Designated officials

43. At each duty station, a senior United Nations official is appointed to serve as designated official for security with overall and special responsibility for the security and protection of personnel of the United Nations system. In this regard, he/she is directly accountable and responsible to me through the United Nations Security Coordinator. In many countries the United Nations Resident Coordinator is given this responsibility. Depending on the composition of staff on the ground, other agency representatives may also be appointed designated official. Where there are other, larger United Nations offices, such as regional commissions or peacekeeping operations, the official

responsible for the office or operation may be appointed designated official.

44. At present, there are 120 resident coordinators, 22 special representatives or executive secretaries and eight heads of other agencies serving as designated officials. In some cases, where there is a peacekeeping mission, there may be two designated officials, one for the peacekeeping mission and one for United Nations organizations, programmes and funds. In such instances, there is close coordination and cooperation between the military and civilian sides of the United Nations system. In the absence of the designated official, his/her functions are assumed by an acting designated official, appointed by the Security Coordinator on the recommendation of the designated official. The acting designated official is usually a head of another organization. Unfortunately, owing to insufficient capacity for training, monitoring and evaluation, officials cannot always carry out their functions as effectively as would be desirable.

45. Because of their special requirements, peacekeeping personnel remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their chief of mission for relocation/evacuation purposes. However, as noted above, the chief of a peacekeeping operation may be appointed designated official responsible for the security of staff of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds at the duty station. When this is not the case, peacekeeping operations maintain close coordination and cooperation with the designated official and will normally take all necessary action in the various phases listed above to the extent that it is compatible with their continued functioning.

(c) Security management team

46. The designated official is responsible for establishing a security management team, to assist and advise him/her on all security-related matters and to prepare a security plan for the country. The team usually consists of the heads of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds at the duty station. The members of the team have to ensure that the designated official is provided at all times with updated lists of all staff members and their eligible family members and their locations, especially in countries where insecurity is high. A well-functioning, integrated security management team is critical to the sound implementation of inter-agency security coordination. Security training for designated officials and members of the security management team is, therefore, a critical element in ensuring the security of staff and, by decision of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, this training is mandatory. It is also important that the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator be in a position to monitor and evaluate the manner in which the designated official and the team are carrying out their security-related functions.

47. In some of the larger countries there are specific areas which are separate from the capital city both in terms of distance and exposure to emergencies. In such areas the designated official is assisted by area coordinators who, on behalf of the designated official, will coordinate and manage security arrangements in their area of responsibility. In order to facilitate coordination of the security arrangements, the designated official and security management team appoint wardens and deputy wardens to ensure the proper implementation of security in specific predetermined zones of a city. The zones covered by a warden are to be no larger than that which would enable them to reach staff members on foot in case of an emergency.

(d) Field security officers

48. At many duty stations, a field security officer may be assigned to provide professional security advice to the designated official. The field security officers are the principal security advisers and assist the designated official and the security management team in carrying out their responsibilities with regard to security of staff. They ensure that all staff members and their dependants are kept fully informed of matters affecting their security and conduct security surveys of residential areas/premises. They also identify and report on potential security hazards; maintain and manage the security and contingency plans; and coordinate the activities of other single-agency security officers.

49. There are currently 60 field security officers who are funded on a cost-shared basis. The actual cost per agency is determined at each duty station on a per capita basis taking into account the number of international and national staff in each organization. The decision to recruit a field security officer is made by the security management team in consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, which requests the headquarters of the organizations

concerned to provide the account codes for their share of the cost. When all the account codes have been received, UNDP recruits the field security officer on a one-year contract on behalf of the system. The officer reports to the designated official and the security management team who are collectively responsible for his/her performance appraisal. However, the officer must also concurrently report to the Security Coordinator. The current system is cumbersome and completely inadequate since it can take as long as one year to obtain the account codes from all the agencies present at a duty station. Moreover, there is no flexibility to assign field security officers to a duty station where there may be an urgent need for professional security advice and there are limited opportunities for mobility.

50. In addition to the cost-shared field security officers, there are 16 chief security officers assigned to assist the chief of mission in peacekeeping missions in his/her security responsibilities. There are also a number of security officers hired by individual organizations. While the function of these officers is limited to the security needs of their employing organization, the single-agency security officer is also required to provide assistance to the designated official and to support the security management team. UNHCR has 46 professional security officers (half of which are funded by the annual programme budget for programme costs and the other half by the annual programme budget for programme support costs), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has six (funded from extrabudgetary resources), WFP has eight and UNICEF has four to cater to the particular needs of their operations in high-risk duty stations. UNHCR has also deployed field security assistants as part of its emergency response teams to better manage staff safety issues in highly volatile emergency situations.

4. Security training

51. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has developed a comprehensive security and stress management training programme for all United Nations system staff. The programme consists of three major components, namely, security management training for all officials responsible for security, including the designated official, the members of the security management team, area coordinators, and wardens; specialized training for field security officers; and personal security awareness briefings for staff.

52. To date, the security training programme has been funded from the trust fund for the security of United Nations personnel. Training has so far been conducted in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. By the end of 2000, training will also have been provided to staff in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, East Timor, Kenya, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Over 8,000 staff will have benefited from this training. Field security officers and those UNDP staff members who assume these functions at those duty stations where there is no full-time field security officer, as well as single-agency security officers and chiefs of security at peacekeeping missions, have been provided with updated training at regional security workshops conducted by the Office of the Security Coordinator. During the course of 2000, four regional workshops were held, at Bangkok, Nairobi, Santiago and Vienna, for 160 security personnel.

53. The funds available from the trust fund will only suffice to provide security training at an additional 22 duty stations, the bulk of which will be undertaken during 2001. Thereafter, unless additional funds are forthcoming, it will not be possible to carry out security training of staff. Given the threats outlined above, it is imperative that funds be found to implement security training for all staff at all duty stations on a continuing basis.

54. A few organizations of the United Nations system complement the security training programme of the Office of the Security Coordinator by providing security awareness training for their staff and it will be necessary for those organizations to continue to include resources for security awareness training in their respective budgets. Over 5,500 WFP personnel received 2 to 3 days of basic security awareness training between February 1999 and May 2000, with more than 10 per cent also receiving training in one or more specialized areas. Over 200 WFP managers received training over the past 12 months in how to manage security matters and people working under prolonged periods of stress. The first annual WFP security officers workshop was held to improve skills, introduce new equipment and exchange ideas. Follow-up specialized safety and security training are also being planned.

5. Stress counselling

55. The conditions under which staff members of the United Nations system have carried out their mandates has changed dramatically. Unlike military personnel, United Nations system staff members have not been trained to deal with the traumatic events which they are more and more frequently forced to experience. In addition, they have not developed the psychological immunity that is sometimes found in those who are required to work in traumatic situations. Untreated cumulative and critical incident stress has a negative impact on staff performance. Those who experience this type of stress are generally not fully productive, have difficulty in being objective and do not work as a team. A failure to properly manage cumulative and critical incident stress can lead to illness and sometimes to life-threatening situations. In addition, prolonged exposure to dangerous environments can make the staff member blasé about basic security precautions.

56. Within the limits of available funds, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has assigned a stress counsellor to assist staff members who have undergone critical incidents. For example, stress counsellors have been deployed to assist staff members and dependants evacuated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. A P-4 position for a stress counsellor in the Office is funded from the peacekeeping support account. The incumbent is responsible for organizing and implementing a stress management programme for civilian staff members at peacekeeping operations and also to develop procedures to ensure a coordinated, inter-agency approach to stress management. In order to ensure that all officials responsible for security are aware of the issues related to stress management of their staff, as well as to provide staff with an understanding of what stress is, the Office includes stress management as part of its comprehensive security training package.

57. UNHCR has a full-time staff welfare officer based at Geneva. The WFP staff counsellor programme has expanded from one part-time counsellor at headquarters to six part-time counsellors, including five assigned to regional offices (Abidjan, Islamabad, Kampala, Managua and Nairobi). WFP has held two annual skills-upgrading workshops for staff in 1999 and 2000. In addition, a peer support programme was established to extend WFP staff support activities to the country and sub-office levels. The first 18 WFP peer support volunteers were trained in April 2000; an additional 60 to 80 WFP staff are to be trained by the end of 2001.

58. Stress counselling has been recognized by most organizations as an area which needs close inter-agency coordination and action. The current minimal response by the United Nations system to this problem is not sufficient and it is critical that funding be found to enhance the United Nations stress management programmes.

6. Communications

59. Adequate communication is critical to any security arrangement. To be effective, the United Nations communications system at a duty station must include a capability to operate on a 24-hour basis. According to a review undertaken by the Office of the Security Coordinator, only 34 duty stations have this 24-hour capability. As a result, when a crisis occurs or a staff member is attacked or taken hostage outside normal working hours, significant delays may occur in bringing this matter to the attention of senior managers.

60. A practical example of the critical role of communication is the need for mobile radios for vehicles moving in dangerous or isolated areas to assist in the delivery of relief supplies. The denial of permission for the use of such equipment by some governmental or de facto authorities can prevent the delivery of assistance when it is deemed too dangerous for staff to travel without a radio. Status-of-forces agreements for peacekeeping missions specifically mention the right of the United Nations peacekeeping operation concerned to unrestricted communication by radio, including satellite, mobile and hand-held radios. Authorities in war-affected countries must reach appropriate agreements with humanitarian organizations in the area of communications. The Tampere Convention, adopted in June 1998, will help to improve the regulatory environment for the use of telecommunications to support humanitarian assistance, provided that it is ratified by the required number of States. However, it is essential that any country agreement or status-of-forces agreements include specific language to ensure that this critical function is available to the United Nations. Member States are urged to render all possible assistance to facilitate the use of the required communications in order to enable the United Nations personnel to carry

out their functions in all areas where their presence is deemed vital.

IV. Recent initiatives

61. Within the United Nations, we have undertaken extensive reviews of our security management system. Two task forces, which were convened under the overall leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, have reviewed policy and legal issues and operational aspects. In addition, I also had a strategic review of our security system conducted by a group of experts.

62. On the basis of those reviews, I have decided that there are a number of internal measures which the United Nations system must take to improve the security management system. It is no longer acceptable that staff members carrying out the mandates of United Nations organizations are expected to serve at high-risk duty stations without being trained and briefed regarding their basic security. Efforts to promote security training which are already under way will be accelerated and intensified. Staff members must receive security training before they are assigned for the first time or reassigned to a high-risk duty station. To this end, adequate numbers of security and stress trainers will be required. If the training capacity is increased, it would be my intention to require that all staff members be certified by their agencies as having received appropriate security awareness training before they are assigned to high-risk duty stations. There is a need to develop a security culture among all staff members, including those in senior management positions.

63. At the field level, resident coordinators who serve as designated officials will be selected with the involvement of the United Nations Security Coordinator. Designated officials and members of security management teams will be held fully accountable and responsible for the implementation of day-to-day security management. All designated officials and security management teams will be provided with specific security and stress management training. Membership of the team will be contingent upon the head of agency having attended this mandatory training organized by the Office of the Security Coordinator. To ensure that designated officials and security management teams are carrying out their functions in an appropriate manner, the Office of the Security Coordinator will establish and undertake security compliance inspection programmes.

64. In order to determine the minimum security requirements at each duty station, the Office of the Security Coordinator has requested each designated official and security management team to develop minimum operational safety standards for their locations and to conduct a systematic assessment of threats facing United Nations staff for each location. An inter-agency working group will be convened by the Office to propose criteria to be used for the suspension of operations and the withdrawal of United Nations staff and also to recommend under what conditions they may be allowed to return to areas from where they may have been withdrawn.

65. Steps are also being taken to provide direct and immediate assistance to families of staff members who are killed in the service of the United Nations. This will include the assignment of focal points to provide families a consistent, caring point of contact and to guide them, if requested, in dealing with administrative matters. A handbook consolidating actions to be taken by all offices concerned and including advice on how to respond in a caring manner will be issued shortly. The handbook will also contain recommendations on how to arrange appropriate memorial services.

66. In view of the importance of following up on investigations of cases where United Nations staff have fallen victim to attack, a separate working group is being given the task of formulating appropriate recommendations on monitoring and reporting on developments to ensure that the necessary action is taken to bring the perpetrators of such attacks to justice.

67. United Nations personnel have an obligation to observe and respect the national laws of the host State, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations; I shall continue to ensure that all staff comply with this requirement. Organizations of the United Nations system also need to ensure that the purposes and mandates of the United Nations system are understood by all concerned. At the field level, attempts to sensitize local authorities and parties to conflict by disseminating information about humanitarian principles through a series of workshops, intended to clarify humanitarian objectives and to obtain commitments from the parties, have proved to be beneficial and have resulted in the resumption of

humanitarian activities in several areas. Such approaches should be encouraged and should continue to be carried out in collaboration with non-governmental organizations and the Red Cross movement. There may also be a role for United Nations Information Centres to develop programmes for public education and dissemination of information on humanitarian principles. These programmes could highlight the provisions contained in the Charter and in international law, with particular emphasis on those articles relating to the safety and security of civilians caught up in armed conflict and of humanitarian staff providing help to the victims.

68. In a number of countries, arrangements have been made between the Government, warring parties and international humanitarian organizations which lay down ground rules defining the arrangements for secure access by humanitarian organizations to the victims of the conflict. These arrangements are based on a recognition by all parties of the importance of observing humanitarian principles. Such operational arrangements have proved, in several countries, to be indispensable for the work of humanitarian organizations and have had a positive impact on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel.

V. Observations

69. The General Assembly and the Security Council have acknowledged the increasingly difficult context in which United Nations personnel are expected to serve in many parts of the world. This trend is a direct reflection of the growing number of complex emergencies in the last few years in which the United Nations is required to provide assistance and protection in situations of armed conflict. There has regrettably been a continuous erosion of respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. The deplorable rise in the toll of casualties among locally recruited personnel, who count for the great majority of casualties, and international personnel striving to deliver essential assistance has been condemned in many intergovernmental forums and elsewhere.

70. In addition to the direct harm to the individuals concerned, attacks and threats against United Nations personnel and other humanitarian personnel also have an adverse effect on those who depend on their help, be they sick and hungry children, refugees and internally displaced persons or civilians threatened by armed conflicts. Humanitarian personnel cannot be expected to provide assistance and protection to civilians, in fulfilment of the mandates given to them, if they are not protected from such attacks and threats. Where there is a lack of respect for those carrying out the impartial work of the United Nations and the freedom of humanitarian organizations to reach vulnerable populations is impeded, the most likely and unfortunate result is that the vulnerability of those populations will increase. In many situations, we do not have the option of simply walking away from dangerous situations, leaving millions of people at the mercy of natural or man-made disasters. Very often the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations represent the last ray of hope for suffering populations.

71. We have a collective responsibility towards those who deliver assistance in high-risk environments. This responsibility is not limited to the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations but includes Member States. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights have all urged States to take the necessary measures to ensure the full and effective implementation of the principles and rules of international law as well as the relevant provisions related to the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. It is equally essential that all parties involved in armed conflict take all the necessary measures to ensure the security of United Nations and humanitarian personnel.

72. As already noted in this report, only 3 out of the 177 cases involving the violent death of personnel of the United Nations system have been brought to justice so far: this represents an unacceptably high level of impunity. The most recent tragic killings in West Timor and in Guinea can only confirm our worst fears — that there are those who believe that no serious action will be taken to bring them to justice for committing such heinous crimes. The staff who are killed are not simply victims of the risk inherent in many field operations: they are usually targeted deliberately precisely because they are there to protect and help vulnerable people. I therefore reiterate my call for all States to ensure that any threat or act of violence committed against United Nations and other humanitarian personnel is fully investigated and that swift measures are taken to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes.

73. It is my firm belief that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the

Specialized Agencies constitute critical elements in the protection of staff members and their dependants from arrest and detention. I therefore invite States that have not become a parties to the Conventions to ratify or accede to them. I also call on Member States that have not done so to become parties to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/59 of 9 December 1994. In response to the request in paragraph 17 of General Assembly resolution 54/192, a separate report is being prepared addressing issues relating to the scope of the legal protection afforded by that Convention.

74. I welcome the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which represents a significant step towards enhancing the regime of protection of personnel involved in humanitarian assistance programmes or peacekeeping missions. However, the Rome Statute is not yet in force and I call on Member States to ratify it.

75. While the adoption of these legal instruments and the various initiatives launched by the United Nations constitute important elements in the overall effort to enhance the protection of United Nations personnel, we need to do more. In recognizing the exceptional gravity of the present situation, the General Assembly requested me to take a number of steps to strengthen the protection of United Nations personnel. These included taking the necessary measures to ensure full respect for the human rights, privileges and immunities of United Nations personnel and considering ways and means to strengthen the protection of United Nations personnel; and ensuring adequate training in security, human rights and humanitarian law as well as stress counselling. The General Assembly also recognized the need to strengthen the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and for a full-time Security Coordinator to be appointed. For its part, the Commission on Human Rights, at its fifty-sixth session, requested me to ensure that field missions are adequately staffed with security professionals and provided with essential equipment.

76. I would like to pay tribute to all our colleagues in humanitarian endeavours and peacekeeping missions who have given their lives to uphold the ideals of solidarity and peace and to give life to the Charter of the United Nations. We owe it to them and to the millions of people who need our assistance to ensure that their ultimate sacrifice has not been in vain, and collectively to do our utmost to protect and support those who continue the job they carried out with compassion and dedication.

VI. Proposals for strengthening the safety and security system for United Nations personnel

77. The security of United Nations personnel is of paramount importance to me and to the heads of organizations in the United Nations system. In order to effectively discharge my responsibilities for the safety and security of all United Nations personnel, I have to ensure that there is careful coordination to avoid the potential for conflict in policy, guidelines or activities that could, in turn, endanger their safety and security. My proposal to appoint a Security Coordinator at the Assistant Secretary-General level, on a full-time basis, is intended to enable the Security Coordinator, acting on my behalf and reporting directly to me, to deal with heads of organizations of the United Nations system and Member States. The appointment of such a high-level official will provide the essential focus and leadership in the United Nations efforts to strengthen security coordination and management. As has been recognized by Member States, it will also be necessary to strengthen the Office of the Security Coordinator with additional staff if it is to be in a position to fulfil the coordination, management and training requirements for the vast number of United Nations personnel scattered throughout the world.

78. United Nations personnel can no longer be required to carry out their functions in high-risk environments, at great personal risk, without the minimum level of training, stress counselling and equipment being provided to them in a timely and adequate manner. The existing system, which relies on unpredictable and piecemeal funding and outdated, cumbersome and complex procedures is simply not suited for the difficult and dangerous situations in which United Nations personnel are obliged to work. If we are to be in a position to deliver assistance to needy areas of the world, often under conditions of armed conflict and hostility, our field colleagues must benefit from adequate levels of professional security advice and support.

79. It is, therefore, essential to replace the current unreliable mechanism for funding field security

officers and to ensure that the required number are funded from the United Nations regular budget. They would be recruited centrally and assigned where they are required most in an expeditious manner: this can make a difference between life and death for our colleagues. In addition to an adequate number of security staff, it is also critical that sufficient and reliable funds be available for training programmes and for urgent communications and other critical equipment. There can be no question that good security requires adequate and predictable funding. There should be nothing discretionary about the financing of staff security: it is neither a luxury nor a perk. It is something we owe those who are willing to serve humanity under the most challenging of circumstances. The cost of providing adequate security is the price that we have to be prepared and committed to pay for the successful implementation of the mandated activities of the organizations of the United Nations system.

80. I shall, therefore, be submitting proposals to strengthen the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator at Headquarters, and more importantly at the field level, for the biennium 2002-2003 so that the United Nations is in a position to effectively and efficiently fulfil its mandates. At Headquarters, the Office will consist of 18 Professional staff members and appropriate support staff. I shall also include recommendations for funds to cover key operational expenses such as training, communications and equipment. For the field, I shall be submitting recommendations to strengthen the existing capacity by establishing another 40 field security officer positions to supplement the existing 60 positions, all of which would be funded from the United Nations regular budget. This number would include personnel to conduct security training in the field. I expect that the total cost of these proposals will be in the order of approximately $30 million at full costing per year or $60 million for the biennium. The detailed budget will be submitted to the General Assembly in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003.

VII. Recommendations

81. **As a transitional measure and in order to respond to the most immediate needs for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations system personnel, the General Assembly is requested to approve the following specific proposals within the biennium 2000-2001 (see annex I for details):**

(a) To establish a post at the Assistant Secretary-General level for the position of United Nations Security Coordinator, effective 1 January 2001, with responsibilities as detailed in the note by the Secretary-General of 3 May 2000 (A/C.5/54/56);

(b) As an interim measure and pending the submission of proposals for the full requirements of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, to establish additional posts under the regular budget — two at P-5 level and six at P-4 level — with appropriate support staff at Headquarters; and six posts at P-4 level, four at P-3 level and 20 local level posts for the field, effective 1 January 2001, with a view to strengthening the operations of the Office in 2001;

(c) To approve an additional appropriation in the amount of $2,776,900 under section 30, Special expenses, of the programme budget for the biennium 2000-2001, to meet the additional costs associated with the strengthening of the Office in the current biennium. Furthermore, an additional appropriation in the amount of $305,800 would be required under section 32, Staff assessment, to be offset by an equivalent amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment;

(d) To note that funding of the activities of the Office and related costs, already approved by resolutions 54/249 and 54/250, would continue during 2001 through cost-sharing arrangements and that the proposals for full requirements for the strengthening of the Office would be submitted to the General Assembly in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003.

Annex I

Resource requirements for the biennium 2000-2001

1. The proposals of the Secretary-General for strengthening the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, at Headquarters and in the field, for the biennium 2000-2001 are outlined in detail below.

2. The following urgent actions are required for the immediate strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, effective 1 January 2001:

(a) Establishment of a post at the Assistant Secretary-General level for a position of full-time United Nations Security Coordinator, with the responsibilities outlined in the Secretary-General's note of 3 May 2000 (A/C.5/54/56), and a corresponding General Service (other level) post for support staff.

(b) A P-5 post for a senior security coordination officer for strengthening the coordination of the activities of field security officers. The main responsibilities of the incumbent would include:

- monitoring of and responding to all security incidents;
- monitoring and assessing crisis situations in specific countries for possible early warning indications;
- establishing and maintaining security compliance inspection programmes of the Office, including procedures to be followed during an inspection, the scheduling of inspections and the preparation of the final report;
- providing advice and assistance to field offices in the management of hostage incidents;
- supervising the activities of field security officers to ensure efficient, effective and standardized response to security crises.

(c) One P-5 and three P-4 posts for trainers/instructors, to supplement the existing P-4 post, to strengthen training in safety and security for United Nations civilian and military personnel. The specific responsibilities of the team in the training unit of the Office would include:

- planning and conducting security training for designated officials, field security officers, security management teams, area coordinators and wardens;
- providing security awareness training and briefings to the United Nations staff worldwide;
- developing a capacity to conduct crisis management exercises to be used in the inspection and security management team training programmes of the Office;
- providing training support to all organizations, as requested;
- participating in the working groups on staff security training set up within the United Nations system.

(d) A position at the P-4 level for a stress counsellor to supplement the existing position of stress counsellor in order to strengthen risk assessment, counselling and stress management programmes. The main responsibilities of the incumbents would include:

- developing the United Nations system policy regarding management of stress;
- conducting duty station assessments, as required;
- providing rapid response in all critical incidents, including death of staff under malicious circumstances, hostage-taking and evacuations;
- providing stress management training to all staff worldwide in the context of the security/stress management training programme of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator;
- providing support to families of United Nations system staff who have been taken hostage or who have died in the field;
- participating in the working groups on stress management set up within the United Nations system.

(e) A position at the P-4 level for a security coordination officer to conduct investigations in cases of death, injury or abduction of United Nations staff.

(f) An Administrative Officer post at the P-4 level to enable the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to provide adequate and timely

administrative support in view of the proposed substantial presence in the field. The incumbent would be responsible for:

- personnel administration, and all other personnel-related matters associated with field security officers and headquarters;
- administration of the security budgets of the field security officers;
- preparation and monitoring of biennial budget of the Office;
- administration of the trust fund for the security of United Nations staff;
- administration of the malicious acts insurance policy.

(g) Ten posts for field security officers — six posts at the P-4 level and four at the P-3 level — to enable the United Nations Security Coordinator to respond expeditiously and with flexibility in crisis situations, particularly in high-risk areas. The responsibilities of field security officers are outlined in paragraph 48 of this report. Each field security officer will be supported by two local staff and they would also be provided with transportation, communication and other essential equipment to enable them to fulfil their functions.

3. The resource requirements associated with the proposed additional staff and strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator are summarized below:

Table 1
Post requirements

	Number of posts
Professional category and above	
Assistant Secretary-General*	1
P-5	2
P-4	12
P-3	4
Total	**19**
General service category	
Other level	1
Other categories	
Local level	20
Grand total	**40**

* Already proposed in A/C.5/54/56 of 3 May 2000.

Table 2
Summary of requirements by object of expenditure
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*2001 estimates*
Posts	1 678.2
Other staff costs	20.0
Travel	100.0
General operating expenses	320.0
Supplies	91.0
Furniture and equipment	567.7
Total	**2 776.9**

4. In addition to the cost shown in table 2 the staff assessment is estimated at $305,800. These estimates, net of staff assessment, are explained below:

Posts

(a) The estimated requirements of $1,678,200 relate to the proposed staffing table shown above.

Other staff costs

(b) The estimate of $20,000 relates to overtime for security staff in the field who are required to work beyond normal working hours depending on the security situation.

Travel

(c) The estimate of $100,000 relates to travel of the 10 field security officers and Headquarters staff of the Office of the Security Coordinator as required.

General operating expenses

(d) The estimated requirements of $320,000 may be broken down as follows:

(i) $70,000 for rental and maintenance of premises for field security officers;

(ii) $20,000 for utilities at the field offices;

(iii) $150,000 for communications, including postage, telephone (cellular, long distance and satellite), telex, cables and pouch services for the Office of the Security Coordinator at Headquarters ($50,000) and for its field security officers ($100,000);

(iv) $30,000 for maintenance of data-processing equipment, facsimile machines and vehicles ($12,000 for Headquarters and $18,000 for field security officers);

(v) $50,000 for miscellaneous services relating to freight and related costs, bank charges, cleaning of uniforms for drivers and other sundry expenses.

Supplies

(e) An estimated amount of $91,000 for office automation equipment, other general office supplies, uniforms for drivers and fuel for transportation equipment in the field.

Furniture and equipment

(f) An estimated amount of $567,700 for the acquisition of office furniture for Headquarters ($31,700) and for the field security officers ($25,000); the acquisition of data-processing equipment for Headquarters ($15,000) and field ($70,000); communications equipment including VHF radios, fax machines, cellular and satellite telephones ($126,000); and the acquisition of vehicles for field security officers ($300,000).

Proposed new structure of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

2002-2003



Annex II

List of civilian personnel who have lost their lives since 1 July 1999

Name	Nationality	Agency	Date/Place of incident		Cause of death	Legal action
GOMES, Joao Lopes	East Timor	UNAMET	30 Aug 99	Atsabe, East Timor	Killed by stab wounds	No
PEREIRA, Domingos	East Timor	UNAMET	2 Sep 99	East Timor	No information	No
SOARES, Ruben Barros	East Timor	UNAMET	2 Sep 99	East Timor	No information	No
BEJARANO, Jesus Antonio	Colombia	UNDP	15 Sep 99	Bogota, Colombia	Killed by gunshot wounds	Unknown
AYOUB, Sheikh Yerow	Somalia	UNICEF	16 Sep 99	Jowhar, Somalia	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
KRUMOV, Valentin	Bulgaria	UNMIK	11 Oct 99	Pristina, Kosovo	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
ZUNIGA, Luis	Chile	UNICEF	12 Oct 99	Rutana Province, Burundi	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
VON MEIJENFELDT, Saskia	Netherlands	WFP	12 Oct 99	Rutana Province, Burundi	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
BIOCCA, Paola	Italy	WFP	12 Nov 99	Mitrovica, Kosovo	Aircraft accident	[a]
POWELL, Richard Walker	Australia	WFP	12 Nov 99	Mitrovica, Kosovo	Aircraft accident	[a]
SAMER, Thabit	Iraq	WFP	12 Nov 99	Mitrovica, Kosovo	Aircraft accident	[a]
NHANIGUE, Luis Armando	Mozambique	WFP	10 Jan 00	Maputo, Mozambique	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
BOONMAN, Joseph	Netherlands	World Bank	22 Feb 00	Nairobi, Kenya	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
SARGBAH, Samuel	Liberia	UNV/WFP	4 Mar 00	Kigali, Rwanda	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
REXHPI, Benet	Yugoslavia	UNHCR	8 Mar 00	Pristina, Kosovo	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
AVDYLI, Erieta	Albania	UNICEF	30 Mar 00	Tirana, Albania	Killed by strangulation	Arrest
VAN DER LUBBE, Gwenda	Netherlands	UNAIDS	4 Apr 00	Sana'a, Yemen	Killed by strangulation	Arrest
TOPOLSKIJ, Petar	Kosovo (Serb)	UNMIK	8 May 00	Pristina, Kosovo	Stab wounds/strangulation	No
ABDILLEH, Yusuf	Somalia	FAO	28 Jun 00	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot during hostage situation	No
HASSAN, Marewan Mohammed	Iraq	FAO	28 Jun 00	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot during hostage situation	No
LYLE, Garfield	Guyana	MICAH	7 Aug 00	Port-au-Prince, Haiti	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
ACHBA, Zurab	Georgia	UNOMIG	15 Aug 00	Sukhumi, Georgia	Killed by gunshot wounds	No
AREGAHEGN, Samson	Ethiopia	UNHCR	6 Sep 00	Atambua, Indonesia	Killed by stab wounds	No
CACERAS, Carlos	United States	UNHCR	6 Sep 00	Atambua, Indonesia	Killed by stab wounds	No
SIMUNDZA, Pero	Croatia	UNHCR	6 Sep 00	Atambua, Indonesia	Killed by stab wounds	No
KPOGNON, Mensah	Togo	UNHCR	17 Sep 00	Macenta, Guinea	Killed by gunshot wounds	No

[a] No information available.

Annex III

Consolidated list of staff members under arrest and detention or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations and the specialized agencies and related organizations have been unable to exercise fully their right to protection*

Name	*Organization*	*Place and date of incident*
Abdala Daker Hayat	UNRWA	Missing in the Syrian Arab Republic since 20 April 1980.
Issedine Hussein	UNRWA	Detained in the Syrian Arab Republic since 11 September 1980.
Mahmoud Hussein Ahmad	UNRWA	Missing in Lebanon since 22 March 1983. Reportedly detained by militias or unknown elements.
Mohammad Ali Sabbah	UNRWA	Missing in Lebanon since 22 March 1983. Reportedly detained by militias or unknown elements.
Alec Collet	UNRWA	Detained in Lebanon by militias or unknown elements since 25 March 1985.
Mohammad Mustafa El-Hajj Ali	UNRWA	Missing in Lebanon since 28 November 1986. Reportedly detained by militias or unknown elements.
Andualem Zeleke	ECA	Detained in Ethiopia since 25 June 1993.
Alfredo Afonso	WFP	Detained in Angola since July 1994.
Alfred Rusigariye	UNAMIR	Detained in Kigali since 22 September 1994.
Elizier Cyimanizanye	UNICEF	Detained in Kigali since 28 October 1994.
Benoit Ndejeje	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 11 November 1994.
Jean-Marc Ulimubenshi	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 15 November 1994.
Jean Chrisostome Muvunyi	UNHCR	Detained in Butar, Rwanda, since 9 January 1995.

* The consolidated list contains in chronological order the names of staff members who remained under detention or missing as at 30 June 2000. The list, however, is not compiled to provide information on all cases of staff members who have been arrested, detained or missing in the past or on the cases where staff members have lost their lives in the performance of official duties.

Name	*Organization*	*Place and date of incident*
Alfred Nsinga	UNAMIR	Detained in Kigali since 8 February 1995.
Mathieu Nsengiyaremye	UNHCR	Detained in Cyangugu, Rwanda, since 12 February 1995.
Luc Birushya	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 13 March 1995.
Athanase Ngendahimana	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 25 March 1995.
Aloys Byugura	UNICEF	Detained in Kigali since 4 April 1995.
Prosper Gahamanyi	UNDP	Detained in Kigali since 12 April 1995.
Clotilde Ndagijimana	UNICEF	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 14 April 1995.
Dismas Gahamanyi	WFP	Detained in Kigali since 2 June 1995.
Theodore Niyitegeka	WFP	Detained in Kigali since 2 June 1995.
Fulgence Rukindo	Human rights field operation in Rwanda	Detained in Kibuye, Rwanda, since 17 June 1995.
Manasse Mugabo	UNAMIR	Missing in Rwanda since 19 August 1995.
Joseph Munyambonera	UNHCR	Detained in Kigali since 19 October 1995.
Andre Uwizeyimana	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 29 December 1995.
Mahmoud Saqer El Zatma	UNRWA	Detained in the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority since 3 February 1996.
Boaz Imanivuganamwisi	UNAMIR	Detained in Kigali since 19 February 1996.
Maher Mohamed Salem	UNRWA	Detained in the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority since 14 March 1996.
Bernard Nshinyumukiza	UNAMIR	Detained in Kigali since 19 March 1996.
David Bukeyeneza	UNICEF	Detained in Kigali since 4 April 1996.
Benoit Twagirumukiza	WFP	Detained in Gitarama, Rwanda, since 6 June 1996.

Name	*Organization*	*Place and date of incident*
Israel Nkulikiyimana	UNICEF	Detained in Kigali since 7 August 1996.
Victor Niyomubyeyi	UNHCR	Detained in Rwanda since October 1996.
J. Baptiste Sibomana	Human rights field operation in Rwanda	Detained in Rwanda since March 1997.
Adnan Omar Mansi	UNRWA	Detained in Jordan since 28 May 1997.
Felicien Murenzi	UNHCR	Detained in Gitarama, Rwanda, since 3 July 1997.
Jean Bosco Nazarubara	UNHCR	Detained in Butare, Rwanda, since 12 October 1997.
Bernard Nsabimana	UNICEF	Detained in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, since 4 March 1998.
Rabah El Bawab	UNRWA	Detained in the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority since 19 June 2000

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Adoption of the agenda and organization of work: reports of the General Committee

Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Letter dated 18 October 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

With reference to the decision of the General Assembly, contained in document A/55/252/Add.2, taken on the recommendation by the General Committee, contained in document A/55/250/Add.2, to include in the agenda and to consider directly in plenary meeting of the General Assembly an additional item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons", I have the honour to request you to schedule the item for Friday, 20 October 2000.

As was pointed out in my earlier letter and explanatory memorandum on the subject (A/55/234), this agenda item is of an urgent character, as the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was signed on 17 October 2000. It is befitting for the General Assembly to react as soon as possible to the important event of the signing of this Agreement. I should therefore also like to request a waiver of the seven-day period that must elapse after the additional item is placed on the agenda, in accordance with rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

I think it would be desirable for the Director-General of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, who signed the Agreement, to participate in the general debate. I would therefore also like to request that the Director-General be given the opportunity to address the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Peter **van Walsum**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-69732 (E) 181000

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The role of the United Nations in promoting a new global human order

Letter dated 17 October 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to attach, upon the instructions of my Government, a document entitled "A Strategy for the Promotion of a New Global Human Order" (see annex), and to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 174.

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Annex to the letter dated 17 October 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

A Strategy for the Promotion of a New Global Human Order

September 2000

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Millennium Declaration has indicated that global economic integration poses the greatest challenge for the new millennium. The Declaration advocates the need for comprehensive reforms across a wide range of areas. In this context, the Government of Guyana is of the view that the Declaration must be urgently implemented in a coordinated manner in order to maintain the momentum of the Millennium Summit. This is necessary to ensure that the commitments made by the Heads of State and Government are translated into action. In this endeavour the rules and institutions that are required to guide markets should place human development as the motivating force for global stability, security and prosperity. This approach is also urgently required to facilitate the implementation of the wide range of transnational issues and governance matters agreed in the United Nations Global Conferences in the 1990s.

Developing countries have generally viewed their development as expanding the freedom of their people to live long and healthier lives. This has been central to the struggle for political independence and the important role played by the United Nations in providing the platform for engendering the process and the means for developing countries to participate on the world stage as 'equals' with the industrialised countries.

The United Nations Charter mandates the Organisation to address political, security, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues in a holistic and interrelated manner. This requires a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach, which embraces the universality of the United Nations. However, the reality of power politics in the 'Cold War' era diluted the role of the United Nations in the process of socio-economic development. This led to

the Bretton Woods financial institutions and GATT system becoming autonomous institutions separate from the United Nations system. These decisions led to serious tensions for multilateralism and the severe consequences of imbalances, and the lack of effective co-ordination in the global economy. This has imposed a creditability gap on the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organisation in the global system of governance.

In sharp contrast, the Secretary-General's Millennium Summit report which embraces a commitment to consensus and collaboration and the United Nations Millennium Declaration have renewed the commitment of Member States to the Organisation's Charter. These two documents offer a unique opportunity for closing the credibility gap between rhetoric and reality and towards the prospect of shared responsibility and global prosperity, rather than ever-greater inequality and enduring poverty.

The challenge for the international community and policy-makers in the new millennium is to redress the imbalances in the global economy in a comprehensive and sustainable manner. This implies the building of an equitable world and more importantly, placing people at the centre of the process of development.

The Government of Guyana's proposal focuses on facilitating a framework for action on the growing recognition of the importance of human development in the realisation of the values and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Within this context, the proposal builds on the growing consensus on people-centred development and on the valuable contributions of the UNDP Human Development Reports. It envisages a number of concrete initiatives aimed at addressing critical issues of human development. The choice that faces many developing countries in the global economy are narrow and

greater efforts are required from the multilateral institutions to modify the system of global governance in order to provide a greater voice and ensure a more equitable distribution of the benefits of globalisation. Finally, the New Global Human Order is based on a comprehensive framework that addresses the strategic issues required for the empowerment of people. These are some of the key elements that are necessary for sustainable human development.

However, these tasks require not only skilled leadership and state diplomacy, but more importantly, a stronger demonstration of the political will of Member States. Taking account of all these factors into consideration, this report proposed the following strategic orientations, and commend them for active support from all Member States and the international community.

- *The need for a new philosophical framework*, that embraces the establishment of a balanced relationship between the role of the state and the market in the development process in order to ensure not only improved economic efficiency but also justice and equity. Within this framework, global governance must be enhanced through the strengthening of multilateralism.

- *Principles of the proposal for a New Global Human Order*
  - Fairness and justice should be the hallmark of international relations. In pursuit of this task, programmes for the eradication of poverty should be based on access to resources. The policy and institutional framework should accommodate the autonomy of national governments to determine their own development path.

  - Third world debt and poverty alleviation programmes should not be viewed as 'trade-offs' with investment and growth. A high rate of economic growth should be a principal goal for all developing countries based on their potential resources. This should be balanced taking full account of the structural differences between and within sectors, social segments of the population, along with the preservation of the ecological base of the economy.

- Reform of the international financial architecture to address the need for new resources for development and for greater transparency and collaboration between borrowers and lenders. This includes a closer working relationship between the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO with the United Nations General Assembly and ECOSOC.

- Increase the level of Official Development Assistance to fulfill the United Nations target of 0.7 percent of the GNP of the developed countries.

- The need for a rapid and definitive resolution of the debt problem. This would entail further debt relief including debt cancellation.

- Labor should not be treated like any other commodity. The special social features of human resources must be accommodated in the acts of production, namely: the need to protect vulnerable groups from waste, discrimination and poverty; the desirability of reducing wage differentials; and the need to provide job security and productivity-enhancing motivation to the labor force.

- The opening of markets and improved access of developed countries' markets to developing countries' exports.

- Concerns about trade and development should be oriented to address equity, fairness and human development, in addition to welfare.

- Strengthening the role of the State as the principal arbiter in the process of development and guaranteeing access of its citizens to health services, education and basic infrastructure services. A number of studies have shown that the availability of basic health, education and infrastructure services are the most decisive factors that generate equity and improved livelihood.

- The establishment of an international arbitration process to address any imbalances in the development process with a view to introduce greater discipline in international cooperation.

- *Major Policy Actions Required by the International Community*

In support of the principles outlined above the major policy actions required by the international community should focus on:

- Support for the decentralization of central government and the implementation of participatory forms of local government to deepen the process of democratization.

- The provision of concessional resources to design and implement effective agrarian reform programmes.

- The international community should support new mechanisms that are required in developing countries to stimulate micro-enterprises and rural development. Such mechanisms should include the provision of concessional credit facilities that address the local needs of small-scale entrepreneurs.

- The establishment of a global trust fund that supports the development of mechanisms for the greater use of science and technology including the new information technologies to build the capacity for training, education, research and development that will improve the competitiveness of developing countries in the global economy.

- High priority should be given to the development of a global mechanism that provides access to knowledge and science about production and processing technologies relevant to the domestic conditions and changing market opportunities to entrepreneurs in developing countries. Preference should be given to technologies that promote environmental sustainability, productivity and improve the incomes of the poor.

- The introduction of international mechanisms to dampen the volatility of short-term capital flows and to stimulate the stagnant trends in the international market for primary commodities.

- The creation of a global development facility funded by levies on pollution cuts military expenditures and taxation on speculative capital movements.

- The development of a "deprivational index" as advocated by Anand and Sen (1997) that concentrates exclusively on the

deprived and impoverished to complement the UNDP Human Development Index.

- The implementation of flexible donor funding by the greater use of 'programme lending' instead of 'project lending'. This will allow recipient governments to agree on broader objectives for funding in particular sectors and decide on the sequencing of implementation.

- The establishment of a global facility to complement the "Digital Opportunity Task Force" proposed by the G-8 Okinawa summit. The global facility will ensure that an integrated approach is adopted that addresses the broad range of social, economic and political factors such as literacy training and the infrastructure needed for the Internet to take root in developing countries.

- Greater support for the protection of the environment and enhancement of the ecological conditions in developing countries through capacity building and the implementation of effective environmental management strategies at the national, regional and global levels.

The principal benefit of the New Global Human Order is that it offers policy makers from developed and developing countries the opportunity to reshape their thinking on reforming the international economic system. The Government of Guyana is of the view that the approach taken so far in discussions on reshaping the world economy has sidestepped a number of fundamental issues as outlined above.

In advocating the New Global Human Order, the Government of Guyana is of the view that given the universal character of the United Nations, its capabilities in the field of economic and social development must be strengthened. To empower the United Nations capacity in developmental matters will require that the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization be brought into close working relationships with the United Nations General Assembly and ECOSOC. The United Nations must be the main advocate of global policy making. The existing institutional framework and arrangements for economic regulations devised by the developed

countries are neither adaptive to the new forms of global economic interdependence, nor to the integration of developing countries into the international economy. A strengthening of the multilateral process is not only essential for the sharing of the benefits of global prosperity but also of the economic, financial, and political burdens. As history has demonstrated multilateralism is a better guarantee for prosperity than exclusive reliance on bilateralism.

Section I: The Context and Rational of the New Global Human Order

1.1 Introduction

At the start of the 21st century, there is widespread and gathering uneasiness in the international community over the capacity of the present institutions and arrangements to provide the required governance to promote international economic stability, expand opportunities and maintain global security. The increasingly complex and interdependent world makes policy choices and decision-making difficult. In this context there is the urgent necessity to move towards a sustainable development agenda that embraces democracy, social cohesion and equity. This requires renewed efforts of multilateralism to meet the long-term challenges of sustainable human development and the medium-and short-term threats to an increasingly interdependent, and highly vulnerable system of international relations.

The challenge for many developing countries is to strengthen their capacities to participate in the global economy on terms that reflect their economic, social and cultural objectives and the development of their political systems of governance. Developing countries require a 'level playing field' that redresses the imbalances in the global economy in a comprehensive and sustained manner to enable their integration into the world economy as an equal partner. This requires the restructuring of the international economic architecture to address the wide range of transnational issues and governance problems that have been evolving in the last two decades.

The degree to which societies can develop the capabilities to effectively manage the far-reaching economic, social, technological and environmental transformations will depend upon the existence and acceptance of a strong commitment to global governance. The combination of bilateralism between nation states, regionalism and other cooperative arrangements among States in some specific areas, no longer provide an effective framework for the

challenges facing humanity. Multilateralism needs to be strengthened and fully explored to resolve the challenges facing the international community. The external environment crucially influences the prospects for globalization, liberalization, democratization and human development. Under these circumstances, the United Nations remains the best vehicle for treating these issues in a holistic, non-compartmentalized and integrated manner.

1.2 The Post War II Development Experiences

In setting the stage for the call for a New Global Human Order it is important to review the development strategies pursued by developing countries and supported by the international community over the last 50 years. In reviewing the programmatic focus by donor agencies to offer international assistance to developing countries a balance appraisal of the development strategies of developing countries indicate that they have failed to arrest the high levels of inequality, poverty and human misery across the globe. Therefore, as we approach the 21st century, it is critically important to focus our attention on a new development paradigm that addresses the fundamental problems facing humanity.

1.2.1 *The Dirigiste Period*

In the late 1950s and 1960s, the development emphasis was on the maximization of economic growth. This was to be achieved through an emphasis on planning, active state involvement in the economy, and an inward-looking development strategy based on import-substitution. The focus was on overcoming the bottlenecks, rigidities and market imperfections that acted as barriers to people's motivation. This faith in the planned approach was symbolized among aid donors by President Kennedy's 1961 Alliance for Progress, which advocated that recipients of US assistance must have a comprehensive development plan. The World Bank later matched this approach to development assistance and a number of United Nations specialized agencies emulated this approach by encouraging development

planning through assistance to strengthen the planning capabilities of many developing countries.

1.2.2. *Promotion of Distributive Concerns*

In the late 1960s and early 1970s there were a tentative upsurge in interests on issues of poverty and inequality. During this phase, there were growing concerns over the alleged failure of the 'trickle-down' approach implicit in earlier development strategies and the belief that poverty and inequality were worsening in many developing countries.

It was during this period that the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) were in the forefront of development thinking. The World Bank advocated "redistribution with growth" and the ILO the "basic needs" approach. In this period, growth and industrialization were subjugated to the stress on: the development of subsistence-level agriculture, integrated rural development, the promotion of 'appropriate' labor-intensive technologies, and full employment, which were critical elements for improvements in the standard of living. This was a conscious effort on the part of the World Bank, the ILO and the major bilateral donor agencies to address the distributional consequences of their aid programmes and to target the incidence of poverty. However, the 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks, world recession and debt crisis overshadowed these concerns.

1.2.3. *Structural Adjustment and the Neo Liberal Proposition*

On the other hand, in the more advanced countries, growing disillusion with the economic crisis during the 1980s led to the election of conservative governments in the United States, Britain, Germany and elsewhere. These governments influenced the balance of donor opinion in the 1980s towards the neo-liberal view of the market as the ultimate arbiter of development. The emphasis was on growth, controlling inflation, minimization of the state in the economic sphere, getting prices right and the benefits of participation in world trade.

This change in posturing by the governments of the developed countries was soon reflected in the efforts of the Bretton Woods institutions and major bilateral donors. The initial adjustment programmes advocated by aid donors were in response to the international debt crisis and focused on short-term balance of payment imbalances and debt repayments. The focus later shifted from macroeconomic factors with 'economy-wide' effects such as exchange rates and interest rates to a generally broader disaggregated, microeconomic aspect of economic management. This was later extended to the configuration of the longer-term development path of developing countries through the process of privatization, deregulation and cuts in public expenditure. Trade liberalization is also a coherent part of this process required to encourage the expansion of exports and promote the comparative advantage of nation states.

The structural adjustment programmes promoted the neo-liberal model of development based on the presumption of market solutions to enhance economic efficiency and the minimization of the role of the State in the economic sphere. The general tenet of this approach is that the application of this model would lead to the realization of income convergence among countries in both the North and the South.

Contrary to the proposed outcomes advanced by the neo-liberal model, the experience of the developing countries indicates that the adoption of the adjustment measures in response to the crises of the 1980s led to lower rates of economic growth, declines in investment levels and deterioration in the social sectors and the living standards of large segments of the population. In most cases, the lower income and poorer groups of societies have been disproportionately affected by the adjustment measures. Moreover, the adjustment programmes have retarded the human development prospects in a large number of developing countries.

1.3 Globalization, Inequality and Poverty

The last decade has witnessed increasing trends of globalization through the integration of markets and production. Tables 1-5 illustrate the increasing unevenness of this process of globalization. Many developing countries are gripped with a disconcerting high level of economic and human insecurity. This is reflected in Tables 6 and 7, which illustrates the high levels of poverty in developing countries. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Reports over the past ten years have been tracking the nature and structure of Poverty and Inequality as encapsulated in the different systems of rewards, and the impacts on human freedoms. The UNDP 1999 Human Development Report has shown that the gap between developed and developing countries at the global level on the basis of GNP per capita measured in dollars and at constant prices, grew dramatically. The figures indicate that per capita income moved from 3:1 in 1820, to 11:1 in 1913, 30:1 in 1960, 44:1 in 1973, 60:1 in 1990 and 74:1 at the end of 1999. That is, for every dollar earned in the developing world seventy four dollars are earned in the developed world. The OECD has projected that these gaps are likely to grow even larger.

This situation highlights the increasing number of countries qualifying as least developed countries (LDCs) on the basis of the criteria set by the United Nations Committee for Development Policy, despite thirty years of international efforts to end this cycle. According to information emanating from the United Nations, since 1971 when this classification of countries by their level of development emerged, approximately one country per year has joined the group of LDCs. Botswana is the only country to graduate from the list of LDCs since 1971. The available information also indicates that in 1977 the 43 LDCs had a population of about 10 per cent of the world's population but their share of world output was 0.6 per cent and 0.4 per cent of world exports. These shares have declined dramatically in the 1990s by more than 40 per cent. These trends highlight the growing marginalisation of developing countries, which is overlooked by the international community.

A look at some of the statistics of the World Bank (2000) indicates that we live in a world of approximately six billion people, where:

- 80 per cent live in substandard housing;
- 70 per cent have never made a telephone call;
- 70 per cent do not know how to read;
- 50 per cent suffer from malnutrition;
- Only 1 per cent is college educated with less than 1 per cent having access to the Internet;
- 1.2 billion people-a fifth of the world population-out of 6 billion people living on a dollar a day or less in 1998
- 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world's population - living on two dollars a day, or less;
- 1.3 billion people do not have access to clean water;
- 3 billion people do not have access to sanitation; and
- 2 billion people do not have access to electricity.

Table 8 summarizes the trends in income inequality at the regional level. Based on estimation of the Gini coefficient, which is the most commonly used measure of inequality–with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 total inequality–the information shows that inequality is extremely high in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the transition economies. Income inequality has also increased in a number of OECD countries and more recently in a number of South-East Asian countries. These trends are most likely to continue rising within and among countries.

The economic and social inequalities outlined above are the principal source of tension and conflict among and within countries. This has exacerbated political instability in many poor countries as reflected in the

increasing number of humanitarian emergencies that has been escalating since the early 1980s. Information from United Nations (1999) indicates that between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s, humanitarian emergencies rose from around 25 per year to 70 per year. The increasing number of deaths from fighting, famine, disease and mass displacement has compounded the alarming situation of economic and human insecurity. A number of developing countries have also been affected by the increasing level of migration of its skilled human resources to the industrialized countries. These are all symptoms of underdevelopment and poverty resulting from stagnant economic growth.

Cornia (1999) has indicated a number of ways in which inequality affects economic growth and poverty reduction, namely:

- **High levels of land concentration** that has been traditionally the outcome of the historic dispossession of rural communities, and/or a failed collectivist experiments which have hampered agricultural growth and rural development. These outcomes have also led to adverse environmental impacts, which in turn affect the process of sustainable development.

- **Government's unwillingness to tax wealthy groups**, this in turn hampers public investment in education, health and the rate of human capital formation.

- **Political instability and economic vulnerability**, which often interacts and destabilize many developing countries.

1.4 What is the source of rising Inequality?

An increasing number of studies have indicated that liberalization and globalization are the principal sources of the growing gap between the rich and the poor within and between countries. In the last two decades, there were three fundamental elements, which conditioned the policies adopted by developing countries and influenced North-South relations, namely:

- The minimization of tensions associated with the Cold War, which reinforced the importance of a mixed economy.

- The emergence of the World Trade Organization and the quest for trade liberalization on the basis of reciprocity and equal national treatment instead of special and differential treatment for developing countries.

- The emulation by developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s of the market liberalization programmes which began in the developed countries in the 1970s. In many instances the Bretton Woods institutions that advocated an enhanced role for markets to replace the state in the economic sphere, imposed these programmes.

These three elements significantly hastened the pace of liberalization and globalization and the emergence of the proposition that integration into the world economy by developing countries should be the basis for economic development.

A number of economists have questioned this proposition advocated by the International Monetary Fund (1997) and more recently by Dollar and Kraay for the World Bank (2000) and the World Trade Organization (2000). Many opponents argue that such an untested assertion by the neo-liberal model without taking cognizance of the new set of negative external factors which it brings could lead to the marginalisation of a large number of developing countries. It is felt that this is likely to be principal factor associated with the elimination of national autonomy in the formulation of development strategies.

Felix (1995) and Singh (1997) feel that the first principal test of success of global capitalism is GDP performance across the globe. They both noted that a number of OECD countries that implemented the first generation of liberalization programmes as reflected in their GDP growth performance have been much lower than the 1950s and 1960s. These studies indicate that the

crucial difference resides in the productivity growth which has been about half of what was achieved in the 'Golden Age' period.

Another set of studies focused on the comparative advantage among countries and the productivity differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. On this basis, it was postulated that there should be downward pressure on the compensation of unskilled workers in developed countries and upward pressure on the compensation of unskilled workers in developing countries. On the basis of this approach, some studies claim that globalization is the source for growing inequality in developed countries. Other studies inferred that the widening income gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries is due to the dispersion of skill-intensive technologies. Meanwhile, a number of empirical studies have concluded that the differentials are due to a combination of both trade and the technological diffusion effects [Atkinson, (1997)].

A number of economists have attempted to extend this analysis to developing countries. The results have generally been inconclusive. Nonetheless, some analyses have inferred that the effects of globalization on income distribution seem to be determined by the stage of development, the level of technological progress and the country's level of competitiveness.

Moreover, in response to the assertion that globalization represents developing countries' best chance of catching up to the developed country standards of living, Mosley (1999) has carried out the most elaborate test of this hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the forces of globalization will enable developing countries to converge on the living standards of the developed countries. Using a sophisticated and superior empirical methodology, Mosley (1999) subjects to analysis the "new Washington consensus" claim that countries that have small government, openness and macroeconomic stability will converge faster than those that do not – as advocated in the May 1997 IMF World Economic Outlook. Among the conclusions arrived at are:

- There is no uniform set of "good" or "sound" policies capable of establishing convergence in every developing country. What may be a sound set of policies in a particular economy is contingent on an economy's structure, its stage of development and the external constraints;

- The timing and sequencing of reforms are important factors to be considered in the process of reform;

- Macroeconomic stability and policy consistency are more important than the pace of liberalization;

- The benefits of openness to international trade and capital flows depend on the stage of development;

- In addition to the contribution to growth by the standard factors of production, other elements are significant such as the distortions in income distribution and the capital markets;

- The role of the state in the economy is dependent on the stage of development as the experience of the East Asian countries demonstrated in the 1960s.

On the basis of these outcomes, Mosley (1999) advocates that aid donors should take cognizance of recipient countries' macro-and micro-economic policies, their level of capacity to implement consistent development programmes, the level of market and institutional development, and their vulnerability to external shocks.

Another set of studies evaluating the impact of the capital account, financial and trade liberalization policies advocated by the World Bank (1998) and the IMF (1996; 1999) found that such policies often trigger divergence in income distribution both among and within countries. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and Slaughter (1998) found that there were wide divergences between the theoretical expectations of the liberal economy hypothesis and empirical

reality. The selected statistics in Tables 9 – 12 show the divergent trends evolving in the global economy.

One of the principal messages of these studies is that liberalization and globalization have not only weakened the capacity of the state in developing countries to make important decisions but have made it difficult for governments to generate revenue from taxation. Overtime, as capital becomes mobile and labor immobile the government's revenue generating ability is constrained. In addition, governments are forced to compete with each other through tax incentives to attract foreign private investment, which further reduces the incidence of taxation to finance safety net schemes for vulnerable groups affected by globalization. These conditions clearly increase the range of risks in the world economy and depress the provision of social services given that many of the required global public goods are under-funded. This is also reflected in the financial operations of the World Bank whose new lending commitments to client countries were down to 15.3 billion dollars in the financial year 1999 - 2000 in comparison with 29 billion dollars for the previous year 1998 - 1999.

1.5 International Cooperation and Multilateralism

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has significantly altered the nature of global risks associated with the 'Cold War era.' This situation has led to the disintegration of the framework of international relations based on the East-West conflict and minimized the geo-political importance of the North-South dualism.

Consequently, the United Nations Global Conferences of the 1990s have informed the international community of a wide range of transnational issues and governance matters that requires urgent attention, namely:

- *Matters that involve the global commons*
  - Global warming

- Biodiversity loss
- Deforestation and desertification
- Water shortages
- Fisheries depletion
- Maritime security and pollution

- *Matters involving issues whose size and urgency require a global commitment*
  - Global poverty and inequality
  - Peace-keeping and conflict prevention
  - Education for all
  - Global communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
  - The digital divide and basic connectivity for the poorest countries
  - Natural disaster prevention and mitigation

- *Matters requiring global regulatory approaches to avoid free-riders and leakage problems*
  - Biotechnology rules
  - Labor rights
  - Trade rules
  - E-Commerce rules
  - Intellectual property rights
  - Taxation in the information age and taxation on short-term speculative capital flows
  - Global financial architecture
  - Crimes against humanity and cross-border crimes, such as drugs and money laundering

The degree to which these highly interdependent matters can be managed requires a stable international framework and as advocated earlier, the United Nations system offer the best opportunity towards addressing these issues in a comprehensive manner.

However, a central aspect of this process relates to the provision of concessional resources to assist developing countries in preparation for the challenges outlined above in an environment that enhances democratization and provide the shared benefits of globalization. The increased flows of foreign direct investment that has been facilitated through the global integration of capital markets is concentrated in the richer emerging market economies. More importantly, it has been observed following the Asian financial crisis that these flows had been short-term investment rather than longer term equity capital. The extent to which developing countries will be able to attract foreign direct investment depends on the simulation of increased productive capacity, efficiency and competitiveness.

Section II Components of the New Global Human Order

2.1 Introduction

There has been significant progress in developing countries in correcting fiscal imbalances, reducing inflation and modernizing key sectors in their economies as a result of the IMF-World Bank reform programmes. However, the results of such progress in terms of economic growth, productivity and social equality have been disappointing. Many developing countries are still saddled with the unresolved consequences of the debt crisis and high levels of poverty and exclusion. At the same time, developing countries are faced with new challenges associated with the demands of globalization, cultural diversity, social development, environmental protection and the consequences of climate change. To avoid any form of complacency and the strengthening of the democratic process in many developing countries, the Government of Guyana is advancing the call for a New Global Human Order.

2.2 The Main Proposals of Dr. Jagan

In response to the tensions that emerged in the 1980s and the early 1990s as a result of the global economic downturn, the late Dr. Cheddi Jagan, former President of Guyana articulated the idea and made proposals to the international community for a New Global Human Order. Dr. Jagan was deeply concerned with the tensions and challenges emerging from the growing disparities between the rich and the poor, both among and within countries. The persistence of poverty combined with other distressing social pathologies such as: the marginalization of people and countries; increasing economic and human insecurity; the non-sustainable use of environmental resources; and, above all, threats to peace, raised fundamental questions about the compatibility of globalization and development, particularly the

institutional challenges posed by globalization. The principal concerns for the developing countries are the constraints imposed by globalization on their ability to undertake autonomous national development. Dr. Jagan's view was that human development is not merely an instrument of development but the preeminent objective of development. In his view, the main challenge was the opportunities offered by the deepening global interdependence–the increasing consolidation of democracy in many countries across the world, accelerated technological innovation, and the end of the Cold War–which are all mutually reinforcing instruments that should contribute to economic progress and social justice. These mechanisms, combined with the outcome of the United Nations Conferences held during the 1990s, which established the importance of people-centered development, provide the driving force for economic security, social opportunities and an enlightened international partnership that would strengthen multilateral relations and provide tangible results.

2.3 Objectives of the Proposal for a New Global Human Order

The proposal for a New Global Human Order seeks to build a strong political consensus and a broad-based global partnership to combat poverty and promote economic security for all the world's peoples. This must be based on a long-term integrated approach to development that takes full account of how governments, markets and societies interact and provide for concrete development results.

Political will is essential to successfully address the challenges of global poverty and inequality and the promotion of full human development. So also is an enlightened international partnership involving all relevant actors, member states, the international community, and non-governmental actors.

Such a partnership should endeavor to build on the vital work done to date by the United Nations in development, including the series of UN

Conferences held during the 1990s, and, more importantly to provide new impetus to the implementation of the many developmental initiatives undertaken under the auspices of the Organization. To this end, the proposal of a New Global Human Order envisages the co-ordination by the world community of efforts towards a new global partnership for effective action. This action must be people-centered, aimed at promoting fully the social and economic welfare of the peoples of the world. It should reinforce efforts to sensitize the world at large to the compelling need to focus not merely on the financial and economic factors but also on moral and social imperatives that place people's livelihood at the center of material development.

A broad international consensus for development and a co-ordinated international effort is key to the global endeavor to eradicate poverty and hunger in our lifetime. In calling for a New Global Human Order, the Government of Guyana recognizes that peace and development concerns are closely inter-linked. The concept of a New Global Human Order aims at providing an over-arching framework that bridges all the pillars upon which development must be founded. It seeks to link issues of vital importance to the developing world with concerns in the developed countries and suggests common solutions to common problems. It emphasizes the pursuit of common self-interest in dealing with key economic and social concerns faced by all peoples. This implies that human beings should be viewed beyond the concept of a market category where equity is generally treated as welfare. The call for a New Global Human Order focuses on the empowerment of people so that they can make informed choices and bringing them closer to the decision-making structures that ensure fairness and justice.

2.4. The Philosophical Framework of the Proposal

The proposal envisages a number of concrete initiatives aimed at addressing critical issues of human development. Investment, technical and economic assistance remain principal instruments to support the development

undertakings of developing countries. The proposal seeks to advance further action on three major fronts. Firstly, there is an urgent need for a new global consensus on socio-economic development. This should be premised on the establishment of a balanced relationship between the role of the state and the market in the development process in order to ensure not only improved economic efficiency but also social justice and equity. Secondly, in this context, it would also involve a modification of the current approach to globalization, which is based on an unqualified neo-liberal ideology in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits from the process and also to avoid the marginalization of developing countries. Thirdly, these assumptions inform the New Global Human Order which addresses in a comprehensive manner a number of inter-related issues and concerns, aimed at ensuring economic security and sustainable human development by integrating key elements of human development, human rights and human security issues. The initiative stresses human development, the need for partnership and mobilization of resources as follows:

- The enhancement of global governance through the strengthening of multilateralism;

- The establishment of social partnerships between the North and the South countries and intra-South Cooperation;

- The empowerment of people with the capacity to meet their basic needs through productive employment and skills development.

These are key elements in the promotion of human development. To this end, consideration should be given to the establishment of an international arbitration process, which would balance the interests of donors, International Financial institutions, transnational corporations and recipient countries, with a view to introducing greater discipline in international cooperation.

2.5. The New Global Human Order

The Government of Guyana is calling for a new development paradigm, which gives greater responsibility to developing countries for their own development, and where people are at the center of the policies. In this new approach aid donors will participate as partners with recipient countries and their people to empower them to increase their capabilities to do things for themselves. In undertaking this task the high levels of global inequality, which threaten the democratic foundations of many societies, constrain economic growth and reduce the impact of poverty-alleviation programmes must be addressed. The old and new sources of inequality must be addressed simultaneously.

2.5.1 Principles for the Proposal on a New Global Human Order

The underlying principles of the New Global Human Order should be based on a number of basic premises:

- Fairness and justice should be the hallmark of international relations. In pursuit of this task, programmes for the eradication of poverty should be based on access to resources. The policy and institutional framework should accommodate the autonomy of national governments to determine their own development path.

- Third world debt and poverty alleviation programmes should not be viewed as 'trade-offs' with investment and growth. A high rate of economic growth should be a principal goal for all developing countries based on their potential resources. This should be balanced taking full account of the structural differences between and within sectors, social segments of the population, along with the preservation of the ecological base of the economy.

- Reform of the international financial architecture to address the need for new resources for development and for greater transparency and collaboration between borrowers and lenders. This includes a closer working relationship between the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO with the United Nations General Assembly and ECOSOC.

- Increase the level of Official Development Assistance to fulfill the United Nations target of 0.7 percent of the GNP of the developed countries.

- The need for a rapid and definitive resolution of the debt problem. This would entail further debt relief including debt cancellation.

- Labor should not be treated like any other commodity. The special social features of human resources must be accommodated in the acts of production, namely: the need to protect vulnerable groups from waste, discrimination and poverty; the desirability of reducing wage differentials; and the need to provide job security and productivity-enhancing motivation to the labor force.

- The opening of markets and improved access of developed countries markets to developing countries' exports.

- Concerns about trade and development should be oriented to address equity, fairness and human development, in addition to welfare.

- Strengthening the role of the State as the principal arbiter in the process of development and guaranteeing access of its citizens to health services, education and basic infrastructure services. A number of studies have shown that the availability of basic health, education and infrastructure services are the most decisive factors that generate equity and improved livelihood.

- The establishment of an international arbitration process to address any imbalances in the development process with a

view to introduce greater discipline in international cooperation.

2.5.2 *Major Policy Actions Required by the International Community*

In support of the principles outlined above the major policy actions required by the international community should focus on:

- Support for the decentralization of central government and the implementation of participatory forms of local government to deepen the process of democratization.

- The provision of concessional resources to design and implement effective agrarian reform programmes.

- The international community should support new mechanisms that are required in developing countries to stimulate micro-enterprises and rural development. Such mechanisms should include the provision of concessional credit facilities that address the local needs of small-scale entrepreneurs.

- The establishment of a global trust fund that supports the development of mechanisms for the greater use of science and technology including the new information technologies to build the capacity for training, education, research and development that will improve the competitiveness of developing countries in the global economy.

- High priority should be given to the development of a global mechanism that provides access to knowledge and science about production and processing technologies relevant to the domestic conditions and changing market opportunities to entrepreneurs in developing countries. Preference should be given to technologies that promote environmental sustainability, productivity and improve the incomes of the poor.

- The introduction of international mechanisms to dampen the volatility of short-term capital flows and to stimulate the

stagnant trends in the international market for primary commodities.

- The creation of a global development facility funded by levies on pollution cuts military expenditures and taxation on speculative capital movements.

- The development of a "deprivational index" as advocated by Anand and Sen (1997) that concentrates exclusively on the deprived and impoverished to complement the UNDP Human Development Index.

- The implementation of flexible donor funding by the greater use of 'programme lending' instead of 'project lending'. This will allow recipient governments to agree on broader objectives for funding in particular sectors and decide on the sequencing of implementation.

- The establishment of a global facility to complement the "Digital Opportunity Task Force" proposed by the G-8 Okinawa summit. The global facility will ensure that an integrated approach is adopted that addresses the broad range of social, economic and political factors such as literacy training and the infrastructure needed for the Internet to take root in developing countries.

- Greater support for the protection of the environment and enhancement of the ecological conditions in developing countries through capacity building and the implementation of effective environmental management strategies at the national, regional and global levels.

The principal benefit of the New Global Human Order is that it offers policy makers from developed and developing countries the opportunity to reshape their thinking on reforming the international economic system. The Government of Guyana is of the view that the approach taken so far in discussions on reshaping the world economy has sidestepped a number of fundamental issues as outlined above. Instead, much attention is given to matters such as: greater disclosure and better dissemination of information,

improved prudential regulation of financial intermediation and changes in the IMF procedures. This approach assumes all that is necessary is the containment of the excesses and imbalances associated with the global capitalist system.

In advocating the New Global Human Order, the Government of Guyana is of the view that given the universal character of the United Nations, its capabilities in the field of economic and social development must be strengthened. To empower the United Nations capacity in developmental matters will require that the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization be brought into close working relationships with the United Nations General Assembly and ECOSOC. The United Nations must be the main advocate of global policy making. The existing institutional framework and arrangements for economic regulations devised by the developed countries are neither adaptive to the new forms of global economic interdependence, nor to the integration of developing countries into the international economy. A strengthening of the multilateral process is not only essential for the sharing of the benefits of global prosperity but also of the economic, financial, and political burdens. As history has demonstrated multilateralism is a better guarantee for prosperity than exclusive reliance on bilateralism.

APPENDIX *

* The appendix is being circulated in the language of submission only.

Table 1: Trends in GDP growth: Selected developing Regions and industrialized countries 1965-1996 (average annual percentage growth)

Region/country	1965-1980	1980-1989	1990-1996
Low income economies (excluding China and India)	4.8	2.9	1.4
• China	6.8	10.2	12.9
• India	3.6	5.8	3.8
Middle Income economies	6.3	2.2	0.2
Latin America	6.0	1.7	3.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.2	1.7	0.9
South Asia	3.6	5.7	3.9
South Asia and Pacific	7.3	7.9	9.4
All low and middle income economies	5.9	3.1	1.9
High income economies	3.8	3.2	1.7
• United States	2.7	3.0	2.5
• Japan	6.6	4.1	1.2
• Germany	3.3	2.2	1.1
World	4.1	3.1	1.8

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, various issues, Oxford University Press, New York

Note: The World Bank defines income groups according to GNP per capita in 1994 as follows: low income $725 or less, Middle income $8,955 or less, high income $8,956 or more

Table 2: Growth of output and output per capita for advance economies, developing countries and countries in transitions (10-year averages)

	1981-1990	1991-2000
World	3.4	3.1
Advanced economies	3.1	2.3
United States	2.9	2.6
European Union	2.4	1.9
Japan	4.0	1.0
Developing countries	4.2	5.4
Regional groups		
• Africa	2.5	2.8
• Asia	6.9	7.3
• Middle East and Europe	3.0	3.5
• Western hemisphere	1.6	3.2
• Countries in transition	2.1	-3.2
Output per capita		
• Advanced economies	2.4	1.7
• Developing countries	1.9	3.6
• Countries in transition	1.4	-3.2

Source: IMF (1999)

Table 3: World output, 1990-1998
(Percentage change over previous year)

Region/country	1990-1995a	1996	1997	1998b
World	1.9	3.3	3.3	2.0
Industrialized countries	1.7	2.9	2.9	2.2
• United States	2.3	3.4	3.9	3.9
• Japan	1.4	5.0	1.4	-2.8
European Union	1.3	1.6	2.5	2.7
• Euro area	1.4	1.4	2.3	2.8
• Germany	1.7	0.8	1.8	2.3
• France	1.1	1.1	2.0	3.2
• Italy	1.1	0.9	1.5	1.4
• United Kingdom	1.2	2.6	3.5	2.1
Transition economies	-8.2	-1.5	1.4	-1.3
Developing countries	4.9	5.8	5.4	1.8
Latin America	3.3	3.6	5.4	2.1
Africa	1.1	3.9	2.7	2.9
Asia	6.4	7.1	5.8	1.6
• China	12.4	9.6	8.8	7.8
• Other countries	5.1	6.4	5.0	-0.3
Memo item: developing countries, excluding China	4.0	5.2	4.8	0.8

Source: UNCTAD (1999)
Notes: a Annual average
b Estimated

Table 4: Growth in developing countries, by region, 1990-1998
(percentage change over previous year)

Region / country	1990-1995a	1996	1997
Latin America	3.3	3.6	5.4
• Argentina	6.0	4.4	8.0
• Bolivia	3.8	4.4	4.2
• Brazil	2.7	2.9	3.8
• Chile	7.4	6.8	6.4
• Colombia	4.5	2.1	3.5
• Mexico	1.5	5.5	7.1
• Paraguay	3.2	1.1	2.4
• Peru	5.5	2.2	7.8
• Uruguay	3.6	5.0	5.0
• Venezuela	3.2	-0.9	5.5
Africa	1.1	3.9	2.7
• Algeria	0.4	5.5	1.1
• Cameroon	-1.4	4.0	5.1
• Cote d'Ivoire	1.1	5.2	6.5
• Egypt	1.4	3.2	5.3
• Ghana	4.3	5.0	4.3
• Nigeria	2.7	3.8	3.8
• South Africa	0.8	2.5	1.7
• Uganda	7.5	6.0	5.5
• Zimbabwe	0.8	6.6	3.2
Asia	6.4	7.1	5.8
• Newly industrialized economies	6.9	6.3	6.0
• Hong Kong, China	5.5	4.5	5.3
• Korea, Republic of	7.4	7.1	5.5
• Singapore	8.5	6.9	7.8
• Taiwan, POC	6.4	5.7	6.8
• ASEAN-4	7.0	6.9	3.7
• Indonesia	7.1	7.8	4.9
• Malaysia	8.7	8.6	7.7
• Philippines	2.2	5.8	5.2
• Thailand	8.3	5.5	-0.4
• ASEAN-4 (plus Republic of Korea)	7.2	7.0	4.6
• South Asia	4.5	7.3	4.7
• Bangladesh	4.1	5.4	5.9
• India	4.5	7.8	5.0
• Nepal	5.0	5.3	4.0
• Pakistan	4.7	5.2	1.3
• Sri Lanka	4.5	3.8	6.4
• West Asia	2.5	5.6	4.8
• China	12.4	9.6	8.8

Source: UNCTAD (1999)
Notes: a Annual average
b Estimates

Table 5: Rates of inflation in Asian and Latin American countries, 1960-1994
(average annual percentage growth of consumer price index)

	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Asia								
• China	-	-	5.8	10.8	16.7	8.4	2.8	0.8
• India	7.1	-8.5	7.9	10.1	10.2	9.0	7.2	3.0
• Indonesia	-	20.5	8.4	7.4	9.4	7.9	6.6	60.7
• Korea,	17.4	19.8	5.1	6.3	-	-	-	-
• Malaysia	-0.3	7.5	1.6	3.7	3.4	3.5	2.7	5.3
• Pakistan	3.3	13.5	6.7	10.8	12.4	10.3	2.5	7.8
• Philippines	5.8	13.2	14.9	9.6	8.1	8.4	6.0	9.7
• Sri Lanka	1.8	12.6	11.0	9.5	7.7	15.9	9.6	5.0
• Taiwan, POC	3.5	12.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
• Thailand	1.8	9.9	3.3	4.4	5.8	5.9	5.6	8.1
Median	3.4	12.6	6.7	9.5	8.1	8.4	6.3	7.9
Latin America								
• Argentina	21.7	130.8	395.1	27.6	3.4	0.2	0.8	0.9
• Bolivia	3.5	22.3	318.2	10.9	10.2	12.4	4.7	6.5
• Brazil	46.1	36.7	284.4	1231.5	59.6	11.1	7.9	3.5
• Chile	33.2	185.6	20.5	15.3	8.2	7.4	6.1	5.1
• Colombia	11.9	22.0	24.8	23.8	20.9	20.8	18.5	18.7
• Ecuador	-	14.4	36.7	41.0	22.7	24.4	30.6	36.1
• Mexico	3.6	19.3	70.4	13.1	35.0	34.4	20.6	16.7
• Peru	10.4	30.7	233.7	83.0	11.1	11.5	8.5	7.3
• Venezuela	1.3	12.1	19.3	34.2	59.9	94.9	50.0	35.8
Median	11.1	22.3	70.4	27.6	20.9	12.4	8.5	7.3

Source: IMF's World Economic Outlook (various years)

Table 6: Income poverty in developing countries, 1993 (poverty line at $1 a day a person, 1985 PPP)

Region on country group	People below the poverty line (per cent)	Number of poor people (millions)
Arab states	4	11
East Asia and South-East Asia	26	446
East Asia and South-East Asia (excluding China)	14	94
Latin America and the Caribbean	24	110
South Asia	43	515
Sub-Saharan Africa	39	219
Developing countries	32	1301

Source: UNDP (1997).
Note: a poverty line at $2 a day.

Table 7: Human poverty in developing countries (millions, unless otherwise indicated)

Region or country group	Illiterate adults	People lacking access to health services	People lacking access to safe water	Malnourished children under 5	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)	People not expected to survive to age 40
	1995	1990-1995	1990-1996	1990-1996	1990	1990s
All developing countries	842	766	1,213	158	471	507
Least developed countries	143	241	218	34	1,030	123
Arab states	59	29	54	5	380	26
East Asia	167	144	398	17	95	81
Latin America and the Caribbean	42	55	109	8	190	36
South Asia	407	264	230	82	554	184
South-East Asia and the Pacific	38	69	162	20	447	52
Pacific	38	69	162	20	447	52
Sub-Saharan Africa	122	205	249	28	971	124

Source UNDP (1997)

Table 8: INCOME INEQUALITY SINCE 1970, BY REGION

Region	Number of countries	Gini coefficient (in per cent)			Ratio of richest quintile to poorest		
		1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1994	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1994
Developed market-economy countries	12	31.60	32.02	32.78	5.59	5.56	6.02
Transition economies	4	22.34	22.94	27.85	3.09	3.13	4.05
Eastern Europe			26.40	30.53			5.08
Russian Federation							
China			31.51	36.20		4.74	6.10
Developing countries							
Latin America	10	49.86	51.39		14.46	15.58	
East Asia	7	41.08	40.98		8.29	8.20	
Sub-Saharan Africa	10			44.64			9.52
North Africa	4			38.03			6.57
South Asia	2	31.06	31.73	31.28	4.56	4.71	4.63

Source: UNCTAD 1997.

Note: Figures are unweighted averages of Gini coefficients and income or expenditure ratios for available years in each period. Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland; Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, Venezuela; East Asia: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand; Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe; North Africa: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia; South Asia: India and Pakistan.

b. The Gini coefficient for 1980-1989 is for the former Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and relates to 1988 only.

c. Calculations are based on consumption expenditure and measured inequality is hence not directly comparable with other regions, for which measures are based on income data.

Table 9: Actual and projected regional per capita growth rates to reduce poverty by half by the year 2015

	Per capita growth rate needed to reduce poverty by half		Real consumption per capita growth rate (%)	
			Actual	Projected
Regions	($1/day)	($2/day)	(1991-1995)	(1997-2000)
East Asia	1.2	1.9	6.9	2.0
Europe and Central Asia	0.8	1.2	0.7	0.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.8	2.7	2.0	0.3
Middle East and North Africa	0.3	1.2	1.1	-1.4
South Asia	1.3	4.5	1.9	3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.3	4.5	1.9	3.7

Source: World Bank (1999b)

Table 10: Standardized unemployment rate, 1964-1999 (average annual percentage)

	1964-1973	1974-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999
United States	4.5	6.7	7.3	5.8
Japan	1.2	1.9	2.5	3.0
Germany	1.1	3.2	7.0	9.0
United Kingdom	3.0	5.0	9.0	7.3
Total of G-7 countries	3.1	5.0	6.9	7.1
Total EU 15	2.7	4.7	9.0	10.3
Total OECD	3.0	4.9	7.2	7.4

Source: Compiled from OECD (1995) and IMF (1999)

Table 11: Indicators of the growth of international economic activity, 1964-1994 (average annual percentage changes)

Period	World export volume	World FDI Flows	International Bank loans	World real GDP
1964-1973	9.2	-	34.0	4.6
1973-1980	4.6	14.8	26.7	3.6
1980-1985	2.4	4.9	12.0	2.6
1985-1994	6.7	14.3	12.0	3.2

Source: Rodrik (1999a)

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